Package documentation is available at matchingMarkets.org and the
vignette is available from the CRAN page.
An application of the estimator in function stabit is in Klein
(2015).
Get started by installing the R software for statistical computing.
To get the latest stable version of the package from CRAN:
install.packages("matchingMarkets")
library(matchingMarkets)Under Linux, the dependency package gmp requires that
you have GNU MP (> 4.1.4) installed:
$ sudo apt-get install libgmp-dev. See
https://gmplib.org.
To get the most recent development version from GitHub:
install.packages("devtools")
devtools::install_github("thiloklein/matchingMarkets")
library(matchingMarkets)or from R-Forge:
install.packages("matchingMarkets", repos="https://R-Forge.R-project.org")
library(matchingMarkets)Java Note 1: If you get a Java error such as
JAVA_HOME cannot be determined from the Registry, this can
be resolved by either running install.packages() with the
INSTALL_opts = "--no-multiarch" argument or by installing a
Java version (i.e. 64-bit Java or 32-bit Java) that fits to the type of
R version that you are using (i.e. 64-bit R or 32-bit R). This problem
can easily effect Windows 7 users, since they might have installed a
version of Java that is different than the version of R they are using.
See this
post and download the Java version from the Oracle
website.
Java Note 2: If the installation of the dependent rJava
package fails with configuration
failed for package ‘rJava’, this can be fixed in Linux by
$ sudo apt-get install r-cran-rjava.
The matchingMarkets R package comes with two
estimators:
stabit: Implements a Bayes estimator that corrects
for sample selection in matching markets when the selection process is a
one-sided matching game (i.e. group formation).
stabit2: Implements the Bayes estimator for a
two-sided matching game (i.e. the college
admissions and stable
marriage problems).
and algorithms that can be used to simulate matching data:
hri: Constraint model for the hospital/residents
problem. Finds all stable matchings in two-sided matching
markets. Implemented for both the stable
marriage problem (one-to-one matching) and the hospital/residents
problem, also known as college admissions problem (many-to-one
matching).
hri2: Roth-Peranson Algorithm for the hospital/residents
problem with couples. Finds the resident-optimal stable matching (if
one exists) in the two-sided matching market.
iaa: Immediate Acceptance Algorithm (a.k.a. Boston
mechanism): First-preference-first algorithm used for school choice in
many countries. And Gale-Shapley Deferred Acceptance Algorithm.
sri: Constraint model for the stable roommates
problem. Finds all stable matchings in the roommates
problem (one-sided matching market).
plp: Partitioning Linear Programme. Finds the unique
matching in the roommates
problem (one-sided matching market) with transferable
utility.
rsd: Random serial dictatorship mechanism.
ttc: Top-Trading-Cycles Algorithm. Finds efficient
matchings in the housing market
problem.
ttc2: Top-Trading-Cycles Algorithm for a two sided
matching problem.
ttcc: Top-Trading-Cycles and Chains Algorithm for
the kidney exchange problem.
Functions hri and sri are based on Patrick
Prosser’s n-ary constraint
encoding model. They allow for incomplete preference lists
(some agents find certain agents unacceptable) and unbalanced
instances (unequal number of agents on both sides).